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Abstract
Service-dominant logic highlights the ability of
service ecosystems to ‘self-adjust’ as a reaction to systemic inefficiencies or external changes [1]–[3]. We
contribute to the question on how focal actors shape
the boundaries of service ecosystems through service
innovation. This is a single case study on a digital ecosystem focused on a first mover in digital platforms for
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs): Udacity. We
found two mechanisms, where Udacity shaped the
boundaries of its ecosystem: ‘user self-service integration’ and ‘gradual partner disintegration’. Throughout three phases between 2011 and 2015 they disintegrated services from higher education, namely offering courses online, designing course, and accreditation due to lowly perceived adaptability of universities
and external pressures for finding a sustainable business model. Additionally, they disintegrated self-organized solutions of user needs and re-integrated them
with new actors. This led to newly shaped boundaries
of the service ecosystem.

1. Introduction
‘In the beginning we tried to work with universities
and anybody who does an education startup, think
twice. Because you are dealing with a super glacially
slow system. […] Then we went the gutsy way and
said, let's ditch all the university, essentially.’ [4].
2011 was the year, when founders of Udacity published a course about Artificial Intelligence freely on
the web and attracted more than 160,000 participants.
According to New York Times information, Anant
Agarwal, CEO of edX, called the following year 2012
the ‘year of disruption’ [5] for the educational sector.
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are educational services based upon information and communication technologies (ICT). Single institutions seldomly design, deploy, distribute and use these courses
completely on their own. Instead, they reflect types of
‘business model innovations for educational services
that are increasingly realized within digital value cre-
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ation networks’ [6, p. 112]. MOOC platforms are oftentimes at the heart of these services. Sebastian Thrun, who
started the first MOOC of this kind and founded Udacity,
stated in 2011, that he wanted to ‘bring education to
places that can't be reached today, to people that haven't
had access to higher education’ [7]. These platforms
changed throughout the years of introduction, initiating
several service innovations in the field of higher and further education. These changes finally led to a situation in
2013, where Udacity’s founder Sebastian Thrun called his
own MOOC platform a ‘lousy product’ [8]. While heavily
relying on value co-creation with actors from higher education as an integral part of Udacity’s service offering, the
composition of Udacity’s service ecosystem changed
gradually. By September 2015 Udacity offered 88
MOOCs (27 of them with more than 50,000 learners).
Many of them, with lecturers from private companies.
We build on system-theory and choose a (critical) realistic perspective [9] to assess how a digital service provider shaped the boundaries of its service ecosystem
through service innovations. In order to form generative
mechanisms we use a longitudinal, exploratory research
design as proposed by [10] in qualitative-abductive single
case study about the first mover for MOOC platforms. We
analyze the content of more than 700 articles from public
media, press releases, video statements and the platform
itself to reveal events and activities by Udacity and related
actors from 2011 to 2015. To triangulate the data we analyze public video statements from founders and investors
of Udacity. As a result, we describe a two generative
mechanisms of service disintegration and re-aggregation
by a digital platform in an educational domain.

2. Service Ecosystems
Even though service-dominant logic (sd-logic) can
hardly be called a ‘new’ paradigm anymore, it is still thoroughly discussed in service management and information
systems (IS) research [2], [11]–[13]. Sd-logic was initially founded on eight [11] and has later been extended
to ten premises [12]. Meanwhile these premises have been
rearranged and centered around four axioms [1], [3]. Each
premise can be derived from these axioms: (1) ‘Service is
the fundamental basis of exchange’, (2) ‘The customer is
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always a co-creator of value’, (3) ‘All economic and
social actors are resource integrators’, and (4) ‘Value
is always uniquely and phenomenological determined
by the beneficiary’. The value co-creation concept lies
at the core of these premises. It describes the reciprocal integration of resources between actors through interactions [3], [14].
In the past, sd-logic has already been linked to network theory, relying on the concept of an actor-to-actor ‘value network’ [15]. This concept was extended
by highlighting the systemic character of these ‘value
networks’ through the concept of service ecosystems
[16]. Vargo and Lusch [3] describe service ecosystems
as ‘relatively self-contained, self-adjusting systems of
resource-integrating actors that are connected by
shared institutional logics and mutual value creation
through service exchange.’ Each actor is a potential
source of resources for other actors within the ecosystem [17]. Value co-creative interaction describe interrelations between these actors in an ecosystem. General system theory – a theoretical pillar of the service
ecosystem concept [18] – is concerned with describing
the interrelations between elements of a system, their
input, output, and throughput as well as the boundaries
of a system [19].
The environment is a constitutive attribute of a system. According to Luhmann [20], a description of interactive behavior between elements in a social system
is a major parameter to discern between internal and
external elements. Following his argument, an (autopoietic) system reacts to events of its environment
through adaptive behavior of the elements within the
system to create itself anew. As we said before, value
co-creation constitutes the interaction between actors
within a service ecosystem. Analogous, service ecosystems are able to adjust through quickly responding
and evolving actors who are loosely coupled [1], [3].
Changes in relationships between two actors may also
affect other actors, as these changes ripple through the
network and impose a self-adjusting character of an
ecosystem [1].
In its core, the service ecosystem concept has
closely been related to service system literature [18],
which describes the nature of services as a ‘dynamic
value co-creation configuration of resources’ [21]
through interdependent value propositions. Service
ecosystems’ mainly distinguishable character from
service systems is their open nature. The system enables actors to improve their current state by integrating
external resources [18], in this case, the creation of
weak ties [22] (or loose coupling) through activities of
value co-creation with new actors. Hence, shaping the
boundaries of a service ecosystem entails a redefinition of the identity of systemic actors and behavior by

other actors in the ecosystem, which leads to the inclusion
or exclusion of services from this ecosystem.
Literature on service innovation is explicitly concerned with an actor-specific beneficial rebundling of diverse resources in order to create new resources [13]. Sdlogic also assumes that each actor in an actor-to-actor-network shares, transfers and integrates resources as long as
this seems to be subjectively beneficiary. Hence, service
innovations regularly occur in co-creational processes.
This paper focuses on digital services. ICT is at the
core of these service offerings. Technology is discussed
as a moderator of value creation processes [1], [23]. It enables ties between actors in an ecosystem and mainly contributes to value creation as a resource on which other resources can be operated – so called, operant resources.
Based on these ties and due to the underlying principle of
standardization and automation, digital services can be
more easily disintegrated into multiple, or re-aggregated
into single services [2], [24]. Service ecosystems consist
of various resource-integrating actors, who choose freely
which resources they use and whom they involve in value
co-creation process. Hence, a focal service provider may
find expected as well as unexpected actors and interactions as the service ecosystem evolves [2].
Prior publications already focused on certain types of
interrelations between a service ecosystem and service innovations. Some authors focused on the co-creation of
service innovation between customers and focal firms
[23], [25]–[28]. Others concentrated on the importance of
inter-organizational ties in collaborations for service innovation [26], [29]. Research on how service ecosystems
‘self-adjust’ is nonetheless scarce. In the following, we
present a single case study of a service ecosystem centered by a digital platform service who redefines the way
its ‘resource-integrating actors’ [3] mutually co-create
value.

3. Case Study: Udacity
3.1. Research Method
In order to reveal potential self-adjustments of a service ecosystem by its actors, we exploratory depict a process on contemporary events. As proposed by Yin [30],
we subsequently perform a case study research. According to him, single case studies are especially useful if the
case in question is critical, unusual, common, revelatory,
or longitudinal. As will be shown in the following chapter, Udacity was a first mover in the field of MOOCs in
higher education. Later on, Udacity shifted its initial business model dramatically towards addressing further education. It is therefore a revelatory, longitudinal and critical
case.
The foundation of our single case study consists of
732 news articles and news releases that were published
between February 2012 and September 2015. We analyze
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about 3 hours of public video material of Udacity’s
founders and investors to complement this data set in
order to triangulate key statements. We collect media
data with Lexis Nexis and analyze it with Atlas.ti. Articles are coded using an actor-centric perspective. To
assess Udacity’s service ecosystem we assess value
co-creation behavior between the MOOC platform and
other actors, in form of mutual value propositions. We
intend to explore behavior, that led to the inclusion of
new, or the exclusion of current actors. For this purpose, we categorize events and actions according to a
business model typology adapted from the Business
Model Canvas [31], [32]. This typology centers economic behavior on value propositions of an actor and
relates it to key activities, key partners, key resources,
(customer) channels, customer support, revenue
streams and costs. Using articles from public media inhibits the study, as we are only vaguely able to assess
internal actions by Udacity, like costs and key resources. We diminish this constraint partly by triangulating the data with public statements of Udacity’s
founders, investors and partners.
Since the concept of key partners directly relates to
actors in a service ecosystem, we discern between actors directly connected to Udacity (e.g., learners, universities and partners) and indirectly connected actors
(e.g., competitors). Even though imitation from competitors is a common motive to choose a business strategy, actions by competitors may have directly influenced customers or partners by rippling down the service ecosystem. Subsequently, we also code actions of
competitors, as they potentially had an indirect impact
on Udacity’s activities.
We refine the coding scheme and draw empirical
findings following an abductive qualitative research
process. In order to describe the process of Udacity’s
activities between 2011 and 2015 we use temporal
bracketing [33] throughout our study. As a result, we
divide the case into three phases. Each phase describes
a preferably homogeneous and continuous sequence of
events which allow for differentiation between those
phases [33]. In addition to this secondary data set, we
collect data on the course offerings from Udacity’s
web page retrospectively for each phase using the Internet Archive (www.archive.org). We use data about
lecturers, their respective company, course data, and
degree information to create actor-to-actor networks
between individuals and organizations in the service
ecosystem for each phase. Due to data restrictions, information about students’ numbers are only available
for the third phase.
This research thrives to look at the self-adjustment
of an autopoetic ecosystem. We assume creating (and
participating) in courses as the continual process, necessary for a self-reproduction of an ecosystem [20].

Actors who give lectures therefore represent a core element of the service ecosystem. To illustrate the development of the ecosystem with regards to this core activity,
we present graphs of the actor-to-actor network on a micro-level, also referred to as an ego-network [34], [35].
Each circular network – depicted on the following pages
– represents a compilation from Udacity’s ecosystem with
respect to alters also participating in the core activity of
giving courses and being responsible for the MOOC content. Each node represents an organization and each tie a
joint course offering between members of these organizations. The size of each node illustrates the number of employees engaged in these courses as well as public collaborations on course offerings between Udacity and the institution in question.
The following chapter gives an overview about the
case of Udacity using temporal bracketing. For this purpose, we focus on a depiction of focal public actions of
Udacity, and events influencing its related service ecosystem from 2011 to 2015.

3.2. How to Create a MOOC Platform and
Overcome a ’Lousy Product’
3.2.1. First Phase (July 2011 to July 2012) “We believe
university-level education can be both high quality and
low cost.” (First line of Udacity’s ‘about us’ page in 2012
on [36])
Udacity’s value proposition: Sebastian Thrun and Peter Norwig published their course CS221: Introduction to
Artificial Intelligence in the winter term 2011. It was
freely available on the web. About 160,000 learners from
190 countries joined their MOOC. Originally, the course
was given in English. Shortly afterwards Thrun left Stanford University to concentrate on founding a MOOC platform in January 2012, called Udacity. According to the
news releases, it was his aim to ‘[…] bring education to
places that can’t be reached today, to people that haven’t
had access to higher education” [7] and ‘[…] making education available to the entire world […] absolutely free
of charge’ [37].
Udacity’s key activity: The first courses were offered
in February 2012. As a former Stanford-professor and
Google manager Sebastian Thrun was able to offer these
courses largely by himself or with former colleagues from
the university. Each MOOC focused mainly on technology-related content, like web service engineering, cryptography or building a search engine. Hence, courses were
mainly offered by lecturers from universities (see fig. 1,
left frame).
Target group: Udacity explicitly addressed learners
from all ages and with a variety of prerequisites, including
students with or without prior IT knowledge, employees
from different professions as well as elderly. It especially
focused on BRIC countries to ‘impact lives around the
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Figure 1. Service ecosystem related to designing MOOCs on Udacity in 1st and 2nd phase
world, for the next billion students from China and India’ [38].
Customer channel and support: An automated system supported learning processes, which heavily relied
on video lectures and multiple-choice questions. Instead of publishing these videos freely on Youtube,
Udacity later integrated them into its own platform.
Peer-to-peer-interaction in live chats, on online discussion boards, and self-organized live meetings on
Meetup.com facilitated basic support for questions and
issues. By implementing parts of these services on
their own, partnering with Open Source Q&A, and the
official partnership with Meetup.com Service, these
functions were integrated into Udacity’s platform
meanwhile. Student groups also met in person by creating local Meetups.
Revenue stream: The course offering was free to
learners. In March 2012, Udacity made first attempts
to commercialize its recommendations of these ‘thousands of students who have learned these [machine
learning] skills’ [39] to recruiters worldwide. However, after July 2012 the MOOC platform gained profits mainly through verified exams. This shift of strategy sets the frame for Udacity’s second phase.
Directly tied actors: After publishing the course on
Artificial Intelligence, some learners unexpectedly
translated the content into 44 other languages using a
service called Amara. Furthermore, they opened up
discussion boards on their own.
Besides having intensive relationships with individual professors throughout the initial phase, Udacity
did not directly cooperate with universities on an institutional level. To accredit students’ activities despite
that, they formed a partnership with Pearson VUE. As

a global partner, Pearson was able to offer offline test centers for learners on a global scale. Udacity integrated accreditation into its main services and priced each verified
exam with 89$ at the end of this phase.
Public media more and more compared Udacity’s activities to traditional universities and noticed the comparative cost advantages of MOOCs from 3,000$ (Stanford)
to 1$ (Udacity)[37] per student, which may strike risks
especially for institutions with medium or low reputation[40].
Indirectly tied actors: Platform competitors entered
the newly founded MOOC market shortly after Udacity’s
founding. MIT created MITx in March and merged their
platform service with Harvard in May, renaming it into
edX. Two former colleagues of Thrun, Andrew Ng and
Daphne Koller, formed Coursera in April. Other competitors, like Minerva and Udemy, followed shortly afterwards. Udacity’s highest competition came from
Coursera. They initiated relationships with the University
of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Stanford U and Princeton U.
Another twelve universities followed in July 2012. Even
though Coursera’s number of relationships with universities rose, they did not create direct profits in this early
phase, either.
3.2.2. Second Phase (August 2012 to December 2013)
“Our mission is to bring accessible, affordable, engaging,
and highly effective higher education to the world. We believe that higher education is a basic human right, and we
seek to empower our students to advance their education
and careers.” (Udacity’s mission statement 2013 in [41])
Value proposition: In the first phase, Udacity explored
mainly the technical and didactical basis of a MOOC platform. A major task of the second phase for all platform
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offerings can be described as finding steady revenue
streams and legitimizing the platforms in the educational system (mainly in the US). While its value proposition on bringing education to the whole glob – including rural areas – has been sharpened at first, conflicts within the ecosystem arose. This led Sebastian
Thrun to declare the way Udacity offered MOOCs until December 2013 a ‘lousy product’ [8]. Concurrently,
he announced to pivot the business model, no longer
addressing higher, but further education in the future.
Key activities: By December 2013, Udacity offered 33 courses on computer science, physics and
business administration.
Target group and customer support: At the end of
this phase, Udacity was confronted with high dropout
rates and noticed a growing misfit between their services and the target group. Many learners ‘didn’t have
computers and high-speed Internet [sic] connections at
home that the online course required’ [42]. Their
MOOC topics, the technology adapted by Udacity as
well as a lack of intensive support did not necessarily
match to early student target groups, especially in
BRIC countries. Udacity experienced a misfit in their
current target group perception, as ‘about 80 percent
of those taking the university’s MOOCs had already
earned a degree of some kind’ [43]. Those students ask
for advanced training in cutting-edge methods and
technologies in order to raise their employability.
Directly tied actors: Translation of the courses that
allowed internalization was unexpectedly organized
and fostered by learners in the first phase. Until February 2012, ‘volunteers have translated more than
1,200 videos, all through a grassroots movement
started by students for students’ [44]. This led to an
official partnership between Udacity and the translation platform Amara adding further customer support.
A joint partnership with LinkedIn (and the other
MOOC platforms) to add “direct-to-profile certification” at the end of this phase already displays a new
paradigm on raising and showing employability
through MOOC participation.
As the first university of the United States, Colorado State University offered credits for students of
their curricula, who participated in a MOOC (on Udacity). For this purpose, students took exams held in
Pearson test centers. Udacity extended their university-partnership gradually during this phase. In January 2013, Californian governor, Jerry Brown, announced a cooperation of San Jose State University
(SJSU) and Udacity to offer a complete online degree
program. In March 2013, the proposed Senate Bill 520
was meant to open the possibility for universities to
complement their current course offering with
MOOCs, if students ‘could not get a seat in the course
they needed’ [45].

Simultaneously, the tendency towards integrating
MOOCs into university’s curricula led to an upcoming
critique from professors and university employees. They
remarked a standardization of learning processes, and a
lack of interactions between educators and learners,
which subsequently leads to a diminished educational
quality. High dropout rates of MOOC participants supported their argument. This culminated in an open letter
from the philosophical department of SJSU to Michael
Sandel (Harvard) in April 2013. Additionally, professors
remarked that cost reductions in higher education may be
‘used as an excuse for state legislatures to cut funding to
state universities’ [46]. Hence, ‘[p]rofessors who care
about public education should not produce products that
will replace professors, dismantle departments and provide a diminished education for student in public universities’ [47]. Lecturers and unions opposed MOOCs more
openly during this phase [48]. The public perceived Udacity as a front-runner of the MOOC movement, and it attached critique on these course types oftentimes to Sebastian Thrun and his company. As conflicts with universities rose in public media and private messages, Thrun perceived himself as ‘the most hated professor of America,
because every other professor was fearing for their job’
[4]. Finally, Udacity and SJSU suspended their collaboration on joint courses for a semester and did not extend its
collaboration to further courses.
Later this year, in May 2013, Udacity announced an
online degree program with Georgia Tech. They wanted
to evaluate the question whether MOOCS can ‘make education more affordable and help diffuse online media
into higher education’ [48]. Within this cooperation, and
for the first time, they directly collaborated with a private
company on a course offering: AT&T. They followed a
strategy Thrun already explained in December 2012 [49].
According to Thrun, ‘new technologies come on to the
market at a very fast pace today and the universities can't
keep up. So they [the companies] want us [Udacity] to
step up and help’ [50].
Due to perceived lacks of adaptability to learners’ and
company’s demands from traditional university teaching,
Udacity began to exploit experiences with online learning
and their platform. The cooperation with AT&T, as well
as their direct financial backing of about 2 million $ ‘[…]
embark on a new era for higher education and for the development of a highly skilled work force’ [51].
Indirectly tied actors: In September 2012, edX followed Udacity’s lead to cooperate with Pearson VUE to
make use of their test centers. Coursera on the other hand
collaborated directly with universities to offer accredited
exams at their campuses. By the end of 2012, Coursera
already had twice the user base of Udacity. In May 2013,
they announced 5 Mio learners on their platform. One explanation of the comparable success is the variety of topics taught by the 204 courses on Coursera at this time.
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Figure 2. Service ecosystem related to designing MOOCs on Udacity in 3rd phase
They also launched a mobile application by the end of 3rd phase
their own. Throughout this phase 57 courses were created.
the second phase as a new customer channel. FurtherAdditionally, Udacity began to create and offer more
more, Coursera – as well as edX – created licensing
courses completely on their own (19 courses, opposing
models for universities to use the platform as an interthree in the second phase, and two in the first).
nal course management system. EdX also commercialCustomer channels and support: In order to reach
ized subservices, like course translations and technical
their target group, Udacity complemented its web platconsultancy, for universities.
form by an iOS and an Android app for engaging with
learners on mobile devices. It was their expressed hope,
that caching learning materials locally on a mobile device
3.2.3. Third Phase (January 2014 to September
2015) ‘[…] Education is no longer a one-time event
would lower entry barriers for users who do not have
but a lifelong experience. […] Education should emsteady internet access. They found this to be a critical
power students to succeed not just in school but in life’
need for learners in the global south. Additional customer
(Addition to the mission statement in 2015 on [52])
support was offered to students within their Nanodegree
Value proposition and target group: A third phase
program (see below). Furthermore they reacted to new re(January 2014 to September 2015) of this case study
quirements to their discussion board, especially with rewas initiated by two events. Sebastian Thrun stated to
gards to a growing amount of spam messages, by changpivot Udacity’s business model at the end of 2013 toing their open source platform OSQA for Discourse. With
wards further education in a technology related field.
the addition of new Nanodegrees, Udacity also emanciTherefore, they created Nanodegrees, a valued credenpated partly from Youtube, by adding Vimeo to the sertial that raises employability. This new value proposivice ecosystem.
tion was set up for learners who long for knowledge
Revenue stream: Udacity acquired new revenue
and competences in a technology-related profession,
streams by partnering with Georgia Tech and private
which guarantees a subsequent job entry in this field.
companies. The new Nanodegree program is built upon a
Key activities: At the beginning of this phase,
subscription model (200$/month for a year). The Online
Georgia Tech, AT&T and Udacity launched their prior
Master Degree creates 6,600$ per student for Udacity and
announced online degree program. Supported by about
Georgia Tech. To gain an individual certificate from
35 million $ from investors, Udacity secured the finanGeorgia Tech costs 399$ per course.
cial backup to creating further online degrees – called
Nanodegree – either with private companies or on
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Directly tied actors: In January 2014, Udacity,
Georgia Tech and AT&T launched their first joint degree program. Participants of the Online Master program got additional access to tutors and projects from
Georgia Tech. Students within the individual certificate program were able to contact professors and partake official exams.
In June 2014, Udacity initiated their Nanodegree
program in cooperation with several private technology-related companies (see table 1). They used these
partnerships to design an online curricula ‘by business
for the specific skills that are needed in business’ [53].
AT&T helped Udacity explicate their new value proposition by offering ‘up to 100 paid internships for
nanodegree graduates’[54]. According to Udacity the
motivation of learners heading for a Nanodegree show
‘[…] double the engagement, double the progress,
more than double the retention rate’ [55]. About 7000
users registered for a Nanodegree by February 2015.
Each learner spent six to nine months until completion.
Table 1. Degree partners in the 3rd phase
Degree Name
Online Master of Science in
Computer Science
Georgia Tech Degree Certificate Program
Introduction to Programming

Degree Partners
AT&T, Georgia Tech

Front-End Web Developer

AT&T, Google, Hack Reactor, GitHub
Google, MongoDB, Facebook, Zipfian Academy
AT&T
AT&T, Google, Amazon
Web Services, GitHub
Google

Data Analyst
iOS Developer
Full Stack Web Developer
Android Developer

AT&T, Georgia Tech
No additional partner

Within the third phase, Udacity largely decoupled
from university collaborations in favor of diverse and
intensive partnerships with technology-related companies, like Google, Salesforce, Cloudera and AT&T.
Many employees of the platform (co-)tutored university courses on the platform before. Now they offered
the technical knowledge and skills acquired until this
point to firms. For the new courses they took over the
design and implementation of the courses with partners from private companies instead. From this point
on, Udacity publicly branded newly developed and already existing courses co-created with private companies and universities as “created by [company]”.
Indirectly tied actors: Coursera (Specializations)
and edX (XSeries) introduced online degrees at the beginning of 2014. For this purpose, university partners
compiled multiple MOOCs into their programs.
In addition, they kept a freemium model.

Both platforms offered single MOOCs freely available for
learners. They only had to pay fees for verified exams. As
part of these so-called Signature Tracks, Coursera explicitly turned towards further education for internal use of
private companies in 2014.

4. Case Summary and Conclusion
4.1. Two Mechanisms of Reshaping a Service
Ecosystem
As the case study shows, we found three phases in
which Udacity gradually changed the collection of actors
participating in co-creation activities of its core services.
In its first phase Udacity launched a platform service to
offer knowledge openly and freely to learners from all
over the world. For this purpose they collaborated with
universities. Individual lecturers and whole institutions
were invited to join in designing and offering courses to
their students. In parallel, Udacity needed to develop a
value proposition related to a sustainable revenue model,
which led to the introduction of certificates following a
freemium concept.
Throughout the second phase, they experienced institutions in higher education as being too slow, to answer
the needs articulated by paying learners and private companies. They struggled with university partners and
moved towards integrating private companies more
deeply into their core activities. After calling its own service offer a ‘lousy product’, the MOOC platform pivoted.
The target group was narrowed down towards people in
further education who reach out for technology-related
professions and fostering employability. Within both
phases, new actors were integrated into the service ecosystem to keep up the service offer. In order to subsume
changes of actor constellation and resource allocations,
we form two generative mechanisms [10]. These explain
how a value co-creative process of designing MOOCs in
the ecosystem led to the integration of formerly external
actors, we call them (1) ‘user self-service integration’, and
(2) ‘gradual partner disintegration’.
If users perceive a lack with their current service exchange, some of them solve these issue on their own.
‘User self-service integration’ describes a mechanism,
where solutions are recognized by a focal service provider
and integrated as part of its value proposition – either by
adding it to its own key activities or integrating it with the
help of new actors. We found two occasions for this
mechanism. Learners in MOOCs co-create value as they
intentionally and unintentionally enrich Udacity’s educational service offer and data sets – not only through peerto-peer-tutoring. While Udacity’s founders initially disintegrated the traditional university lecture into a video
stream that was uploaded by a few lecturers to the web,
(1a) students created complementary discussion boards
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and live meetings throughout the first phase. Later on,
Udacity integrated these resources through internalization of video streaming, content distribution and
online discussion functions into its own MOOC platform. For this purpose, they adapted external services,
from YouTube (Vimeo), Meetup.com, Open Source
Q&A, and Discourse to their platform. (1b) Learners
also improved the video and text-based content by unexpectedly translating subtitles on their own. Udacity
reacted in the second phase, as they officially partnered with the crowd-translation platform Amara.
In cases where a focal service sees current service
exchanges as inferior, it may choose to follow a ‘gradual partner disintegration’ in order to acquire resources from an external actor, instead. Relationship
between Udacity and its university partners went from
complementary to substitutive over the time observed
in this case study. Within the first phase Udacity’s
value proposition mainly complemented university offering within their core market (higher education).
Universities offered the content, Udacity published it
to a large target group on the web and gave technical
support. (2a) But unlike edX or Coursera until this
point, Udacity began to substitute one of universities
core value propositions – accreditation and examination – with the help of a private company partner, Pearson VUE. Within the second phase, Udacity initiated
partnerships with universities to offer online degrees.
The degree itself was still accredited by the universities. Their first try to make MOOCs part of university
curricular with SJSU was nevertheless suspended at
first and not further extended later on. With the beginning of its third phase Udacity partnered with Georgia
Tech to offer a full online master’s degree. Since 2014
no extensions to university collaborations were scarce.
Instead, Udacity laid the foundation to further disintegrate this resource from higher education by substituting traditional degree programs, they call Nanodegree.
As Udacity directly complemented more and more
of universities core services, public media and individual professors criticized high dropout rates and their
perception of low educational quality. Competitors,
like Coursera, offered by far more MOOCs with the
help of a multitude of professors from a variety of universities across the US – and beyond both oceans.
Hence, we could assume that the perceived influence
on the debate on educational quality of MOOCs may
also be influenced by competitor’s actions. We assume
from the discussion within the media and Sebastian
Thrun’s retrospective statements, that the ongoing debate about dropouts and the lack of quality of MOOCs
in general had an impact on Udacity’s decision to
change their value proposition towards targeting academics and professionals.

Table 2. Course and partner development
No. of
Courses

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

11

33

90

Number of Lecturers per Institution
Company

2

19 (+17)

51 (+32)

University

6

22 (+16)

34 (+12)

Udacity

6

15 (+9)

33 (+18)

Sums

14

56

118

(2b) In parallel, Udacity began collaborating with private companies in the field of ICT on the content of a
MOOC. Instead of deeply integrating university employees and professors into their MOOC service offering,
Udacity partnered with ‘industry leaders’, like Google,
Facebook, Salesforce, NVIDIA, mongoDB, and AT&T,
in the third phase (see table 2). Competitors, like Coursera
or edX, also integrate industry partners into their Specializations from time to time. In comparison, their platforms
nevertheless always set individuals from universities into
the heart of their MOOC programs. In contrast, Udacity
co-created its core services with private companies, as
they set and design MOOCs and Nanodegrees. Furthermore, they provide case studies and exercises based on
practical issues using their own services and platforms –
e.g., Android OS, Facebook Open Graph, or NVIDIA’s
CUDA platform on parallel computing – as course materials. In order to be able to teach these current and specific
methods and technologies to a highly specialized target
group, Udacity offered their accumulated knowledge and
skillset in designing online courses with these firms.
Thus, Udacity shifted towards further education and became less a complementary to universities, but aimed at
becoming a substitute. They focused on raising employability. Their motivation was described as ‘unbundling’
higher from further education to prepare for a time, where
having ‘a PhD or an MA or even a BA won’t be a job
requirement’ [56]. As a result, 57 out of 90 MOOCs were
offered without any university participation by September
2015.

4.2. Conclusion and Implications
Agility and adaptability of actors ensures sustainability of a service ecosystem by fostering its ability on an
elemental level to self-adjust in cases of external changes
or restraints that lead to subjective inefficiencies [1], [13].
This case study explores self-adjustment in an educational
service ecosystem. Creating online courses are described
as autopoetic processes of self-production. By presenting
the development of Udacity from 2011 to 2015, we exemplify two generative mechanisms that led to a reformation
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of actors in the ecosystem: (1) ‘user self-service integration’ and (2) ‘gradual partner disintegration’. We
exhibit how students, universities, and private companies – as actors within the service ecosystem – added
resources to the ecosystem while creating MOOCs,
that were disintegrated by a focal service provider at
first and reintegrated, later on, with external actors.
This focal service provider recognized users, who perceived a relevant demand and solved it on their own.
Then it reintegrated this resource as part of a ‘user selfservice integration’. Udacity integrated student-based
discussion boards, translation services and local meetings with the help of new actors. Other core resources
were reallocated from partners, which were perceived
as being not adaptable, rigid or too slow as part of a
‘gradual partner disintegration’. With regards to Udacity, the role from institutions in higher education as a
complementary source of resources changed into becoming substitutive. They gradually replaced services
from universities, like course content, design, and accreditation, with private firms. This paper sheds light
on mechanisms of self-adjustment in service ecosystems [1], [13]. It extends our understanding of service
rebundling [13], disintegration and reaggregation [2],
[24] over time and how focal actors may use these to
reshape the boundaries of a service ecosystem.
Especially due to limitations on external validity,
we mainly hold managerial implications for the educational sector. The case study shows how the fields
of higher and further education entangle over time.
The capacity of companies to exploit new technologies
by disintegrating key activities from partners (here
universities) gives the opportunity to integrate new actors into an ecosystem. Even though power was only
vaguely referred to in this article, we may presume,
that especially platform owners want to explore strategies of fast (out)learning from partners with unique
resources (here universities or lecturers), before supporting a process of gradual disintegration and reaggregation. As such, we may also shed light on possible
extensions to a strategizing debate on digital platforms
[57]. This is also a call onto service providers to spot
and realize self-solutions by end users, not only of
their own, but also for direct co-creators. Udacity was
able to gain more control over otherwise concealed
end user-activity, by partnering with crowd-translation
organization Amara, Meetup.com, or by integrating
discussion board applications into their digital platform after users solved related issues on their own.

4.3. Limitations
Even though Udacity may represent an exemplary
case for a range of digital platforms that exist today,

there are some limitations from using single case studies
as a research method. Data collection and analysis focus
on a MOOC platform. External validity is an inherent limitation of single case studies. Hence, we cannot directly
subsume to generalized effects of all service innovations
within digital ecosystems. Our set of publicly available
data from media may contain opinions of their pertaining
authors. Thus, we narrow data selection biases by using a
diversity of (online and offline) press releases, video
statements, and data collected from the Udacity platform
itself for each phase.
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